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ABSTRACT
By using data for 45 countries, for a time span between 2009 and 2014, 
the present paper supports the thesis of a positive and significant 
correlation between the rule of law and capital market development. 
In order to achieve this goal, the Rule of Law variable reported by 
Worldwide Governance Indicators is considered. The relationship 
remains robust even if control variables such as other legal system 
variables, including protection of minority investors, enforcing 
contracts or strength of legal rights of borrowers and lenders as 
well as initial levels of market development, economic growth, 
market liquidity, domestic credit to private sector and foreign direct 
investments are considered.
1. Introduction
The concept of the rule of law, which refers basically to the absolute supremacy of the ordinary 
law as opposed to arbitrary power on the part of the government, to the fact that all are equal 
before the law and to the fact that the rights of the individuals are secured by the remedies 
of private laws rather than by guarantees set in a formal way (Dicey, 1960; Marshall, 1971; 
Wade & Bradley, 1985), is not a new one. The rule of law refers to the laws, regulations, 
government policies and programmes, and basic infrastructure and services that support 
the full functioning of a market-based economy (North, 1990). The rule of law determines 
the extent of protection and enforcement of legal rights of local companies and physical 
persons (Fogel, Hawk, Morck, & Yeung, 2006).
The rule of law was regarded as taking into account the linkage between law and economic 
development, through property rights and contract enforcement (Asoni, 2008; Coase, 1960; 
Williamson, 1971).
Newer literature sets a focus on the role of institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 
2005) and shows that these institutions are significant for long-run economic performance. 
A broad literature has appeared about the connection between more robust property rights 
protection and better long-run economic performance (Asoni, 2008; Barro, 1997; Keefer, 
2004). Institutions serve as the ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interac-
tions’ in order to reduce uncertainty in economic transactions by establishing an efficient, 
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predictable and stable structure to exchange (North, 1990; Peng, 2010). Institutions are ‘the 
rules of the game or humanly devised structures that provide incentives and constraints to 
economic players’ (North, 1990), their role being to reduce uncertainty (Peng, 2010) and 
risks associated with political instability, social unrest, government policies and interference 
in business operations.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that centralised political institutions provide incentives 
for leaders to limit the extent of arbitrary behaviour on the part of lower-level officials. In 
the case of decentralised corruption, property rights are less secure (Mauro, 1995). When 
analysing the factors that can generate economic growth, the endogeneity of institutions 
is a sensitive issue. And the tendency to autocorrelation also complicates the problem of 
measuring the rule of law (Arndt & Oman, 2006).
One important element of international competitiveness and national economic growth 
is the formal institutional environment (government legislation, policies and programmes) 
(Peng, 2010).
In 1997, Barro, in order to measure the rule of law, argued that an overall index of the 
‘law and order tradition’ provides the best measurement for ‘overall maintenance of the rule 
of law’. He considers that the attractiveness of a country’s investment climate is determined 
by the effectiveness of law enforcement and the state of other influences on the security of 
property rights. He also proves in his study that democracy does not have positive effects 
and might even be mildly adverse for growth.
A country with sound political institutions, a sound and strong judicial system, clear 
rules and citizens willing to accept the established institutions and laws is considered to 
have a strong rule of law (Oxley & Yeung, 2001). The rule of law contributes to the creation 
of a stable financial environment (Hausmann, Pritchett, & Rodrik, 2005) where property 
rights are protected (Haggard & Tiede, 2011) and investors feel trust in the transactional 
environment (Fogel et al., 2006).
If legal institutions matter, ownership concentration should be higher in countries with 
poor investor protection than in countries with strong protections for investors, mainly 
because minority shareholders are more prudent in countries with weak legal protection.
There is research trying to identify the impact of institutional quality on financial devel-
opment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998). This research considers 
that legal origins are important in determining creditor rights and that the effectiveness of 
legal institutions has a strong impact on equity and credit market development. Nacuer, 
Ghazouani, and Omran (2007) found that macroeconomic instability has a negative and 
significant relationship with stock market capitalisation. Others have tried to explain the 
relation between liquidity in the stock market and the development of the stock market. 
Some consider that liquidity in the stock market is good for the development of the stock 
market (Levine & Zervos, 1998; Yartey, 2008), while others argue to the contrary (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986). Yartey (2008) explains that liquid markets facilitate the investors’ access 
to their savings, boosting their confidence in stock market investment. Bencivenga, Smith, 
and Starr (1996) argue that liquidity affects the choice of investments because liquid markets 
allow the ownership of capital to be transferred at lower costs.
In the next part of the paper we develop a theoretical framework by taking into account 
and explaining the links between the financial markets’ evolution, rule of law and different 
factors considered to be relevant (see for instance Revia (2013) for a similar approach). 
Among these, we refer to economic growth, market-related risk, institution development, 
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interactions with the banking system, etc. We also present the data sets that we used for 
testing our hypothesis. The final part of the paper is dedicated to presenting the results we 
have obtained and to drawing conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework
In the present paper, we base our theoretical framework on a simple model of development 
of financial markets. Such a model aims to capture the non-linear linkages between financial 
markets’ status and a set of various factors which are related to: (1) the overall economic 
growth; (2) the market efficiency (as this is expressed in terms of the market’s returns) and 
(3) the specific endogenous and exogenous risks.
First, we consider the non-uniform impact of economic growth on markets’ develop-
ments. In the short term, fast growth processes might lead to deep structural changes for 
various economic sectors and hence might induce a functional instability at the market 
level. However, in the long run, markets are driven by overall economic performances and 
there are bi-univocal relationships between the evolutionary patterns of financial sectors 
and growth.
Second, a key intrinsic factor of market development is related to key return and risk 
variables: higher returns will attract more investors and hence can contribute to an increase 
in market liquidity. Meanwhile, ‘excessive’ returns can be seen as a reflection of various 
types of market inefficiency and imperfect market mechanisms. Similarly, a certain level of 
different intrinsic and extrinsic risks assumed by investors can be seen as ‘part of the game’. 
But ‘too high’ levels of risks can induce greater preferences for speculative behaviours and 
can lead to moral hazards and adverse selection situations.
Formally, the evolution of a variable reflecting market development (such as market 
capitalisation) can be depicted as:
Here m stands for (logarithm of) market capitalisation during the current period t, α0 is 
long-run trends in market development, y is the economic growth, η is a measure of market 
returns, R is the global trading risk, x is a matrix containing the dynamics of other relevant 
determinants of market development and εM is exogenous shock information (supposed 
to follow a normal distribution).
Bencivenga et al. (1996) argue that stock market liquidity contributes to growth. Also, 
Obstfeld (1994) shows that internationally integrated stock markets help investors use 
international risk sharing and contributes to an increased rate of economic growth. Still, 
not all authors have similar opinions. Devereux and Smith (1994), for example, consider 
that international risk sharing does not contribute to generating economic growth, but on 
the contrary it can reduce saving rates and decrease economic growth. Levine and Zervos 
(1998) establish a connection between stock market development and economic growth by 
using pooled cross-country time series regressions and the conglomerate index of overall 
stock market development created by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008). They show that 
stock market development is positively correlated with measures of financial intermediary 
development and also with economic growth.
mt = 훼0 − 훼1yt + 훼2y
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Hence, the literature reveals three channels between stock market development and 
economic growth: liquidity, diversification and a corporate market.
In addition, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) documented empirically that legal rules pro-
tecting investors depend upon the legal traditions. They show that the laws of common law 
countries are more protective of outside investors than the laws of civil law.
Hence:
 
Here L is an index of institutions and public policies status and effectiveness aiming to 
capture the institutional features of the social and economic environment.
It should be noticed that relation (2) implies a full spectrum of risk-averse behaviours. 
Hence, the implicit hypothesis here is that the market is formed by agents with hetero-
geneous risk profiles. It also implies that various cases of ‘irrational’ / ‘bounded rational’ 
behaviours are occurring under the impact of individual and social mechanisms.
Substituting (2) in (1) yields:
The model can be extended by accounting for the interactions between financial markets and 
the banking system. More exactly, it can be argued that investors acting in financial systems 
with larger (deeper and more efficient) banks can benefit from a reduction in the costs of 
risk absorption while the markets as a whole benefit from some ‘reputation bonuses’. At the 
same time, larger financial markets allow banks to benefit from more efficient instruments 
of risk management and to better screen their borrowers. However, an easier access to bank 
loans and a better design of the rights of borrowers and lenders will attenuate the need 
of non-financial agents to bypass the lending from credit institutions by issuing financial 
instruments of debt, and hence will be rather less supportive of the development of financial 
markets and will inhibit the incentives for initial public offerings. 
As Fama and Diamond show (Diamond, 1991; 1997; Fama, 1985), granting and renew-
ing bank loans provides positive signals to outside investors. James (1987) finds that bank 
loan agreements convey positive information to investors. Still, Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) identify a difference between the impact of new credits being granted versus the 
renewal of old ones, and show that the information useful for capital markets arises more 
from the monitoring of already existing credits. Bank lending also reduces the cost for firms 
seeking to access capital markets (Datta, Datta, & Patel, 1999). Yasuda (2005) proves that 
bank relationships are valuable for junk-debt and first-time issuers, and Drucker and Puri 
(2007) show that commercial bank credit reduces underwriting fees and gross spreads of 
equity offerings.
Banks that operate in systems with deeper and more efficient capital markets have lower 
costs of risk absorption and reputation signalling than banks operating in smaller capital 
markets.
(2)
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Thus:
Here b is a variable describing the importance of banking sector for the financial interme-
diation processes (such as the domestic credit provided to private sector by banks).
Jointly considering (2) and (4):
Here, a stands for an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws 
protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending.
Also, a financial market located in an open economy will be significantly influenced 
by globalisation processes and the related financial flows (together with the exogenous 
corresponding risks).
As financial globalisation can lead to large benefits, particularly to the development of 
the financial system, the relation between international capital flows and economic growth 
has been studied by different authors, on different samples of countries and for different 
time periods, leading to very different conclusions.
Financial globalisation can increase the availability of funds and also the financial infra-
structure, reducing the problem of asymmetric information. Therefore, financial globali-
sation can decrease adverse selection and moral hazard, and offers borrowers and lenders 
a more transparent, competitive, and efficient financial system.
Financial globalisation carries some risks too, risks that are more likely to appear in 
the short run, when countries open up. If the right financial infrastructure does not exist, 
liberalisation and capital inflows can destroy the financial system and segmentation can 
appear. So, to avoid these risks, markets need to be properly regulated and supervised.
Meanwhile, globalisation can also impact some national policies and institutions: par-
ticipation in international institutions and mechanisms, and integration into international 
real and capital flows might require several adjustments for national legislative and policy 
structures. Consequently, one can distinguish between features of national institutions that 
are locally determined (Ll) and impacted by international factors (Lf).
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Here o is a measure for the degree of openness (as this is reflected, for instance, by net 
foreign investments inflows).
Finally, if the market is in steady-state (*), then the returns are mainly driven by fun-
damentals related to economic performances of financial assets issuers as well as by the 
stability and predictability of the institutional framework:
 
 
Relation (9) synthetises our framework: an increase in the quality of the institutional frame-
work can lead to an improvement in the overall market conditions and can support its 
overall development. Such impact is modulated by the corresponding elasticities of mar-
ket-to-specific risks and of risks-to-quality of public policies and institutions. The following 
assumptions are directly linked to this framework:
H1: There is a non-linear relationship between financial markets development and economic 
growth;
H2: There is a positive impact of market efficiency on market development;
H3: A sound and well-developed banking sector can sustain a positive dynamic of financial 
markets. Meanwhile, an expanded access to credit will be rather non-supportive for markets 
growth;
H4: Better public institutions and policies, in general, and an efficient and ethical legal system, 
in particular, can support the development of financial markets. Risk reduction is one of the 
main transmission channels for the impact of institutions on financial sector development. 
The transparency, predictability and stability of institutions and legislation are others critical 
channels.
H5: Globalisation exercises a dual impact on local financial markets. On one hand, it directly 
impacts their development via the net capital inflows. One other hand, political and economic 
globalisation re-shape the local institutions and policies with effects that are translated at the 
level of the entire economy (including the financial sector).
We further search for empirical evidence to support these assumptions.
3. International data
Data represent 10-year averages and cover a time span between 2009 and 2014 of all available 
information for a sample of 45 countries (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, 
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Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States). The 10-year averages are designed 
to reflect the long-run tendencies in variables rather that short-run fluctuations, and to 
isolate the fluctuations induced by current business cycles. In other words, we presume 
that there is a certain hysteresis effect at the level of the impact exercised by the rule of law 
on market capitalisation as the investors are taking more into account the multi-periodic 
characteristics of the legal system and less the current adjustments in this system.
In order to describe the status of the legal system we use the Rule of Law index from 
the World Bank Institute’s (World Bank, 2014) Worldwide Governance Indicators (W.G.I.) 
project.
The data sources used in the computation of this index reflect the perceptions of a very 
diverse group of respondents (individuals, domestic companies, country analysts, major 
multilateral development agencies, and various nongovernmental organisations as well as 
commercial business information providers). Despite the potential for criticism related 
to their ‘subjective’ nature, the choice of such an assessment method based on subjective 
judgements can be defended based on an argument provided by Mimicopoulos and Kyj 
(2007:13): ‘despite possibly ambiguous perceptions of citizens or experts, subjective data 
provides information when objective data may not be relevant or available’.
The data are aggregated based on unobserved components models. The aggregate measure 
is reported in standard normal units, ranging from around –2.5 to 2.5 with a zero mean and 
a unit standard deviation in each period (see Kaufmann et al. (2007, 2010) and Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2008) for more details).
Since our explanatory framework is rather on the supply side for borrowed financial 
resources by reflecting the investors’ point of view, we chose market capitalisation as the 
dependent variable instead of other possible descriptors of market development (such as 
number of listed companies, portfolio investments, taxonomy of traded financial assets, 
and so one). However, beside market capitalisation, we preliminary check for other two 
measures: number of domestic listed companies and market turnover (see Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine(1996) for the relevance of such market development measures).
These data are collected from World Bank’ World Development Indicators database 
(World Bank, 2015). From the same source, several other explanatory variables suggested 
by the involved conceptual framework are considered: G.N.I. per capita (formerly G.N.P. 
per capita), the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas 
method, divided by the midyear population; stocks traded, total value (% of G.D.P.) as a 
measure of market liquidity; domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of G.D.P.) as a 
measure of banking sector development and foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
G.D.P.). We also control for the initial levels of market development (values for 2000). In 
addition, we consider three other institutional variables. First, we involve the Strength of 
Legal Rights from World Bank’s Doing Business project (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). 
We expect higher values of this index to inhibit market capitalisation based on the sub-
stitution in financing sources argument for banking sector and financial markets. Second, 
we involve another component of the Doing Business framework, namely the Protecting 
Minority Investors index: better protection of minority investors’ rights should support 
market development. Finally, we consider the Enforcing Contracts index, also from the Doing 
Business analysis: a more efficient system of enforcing contracts and resolving commercial 
disputes can be expected to contribute to market enhancement.
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All three indexes are considered in terms of their ‘distance to frontier’ score. The ‘frontier’ 
represents the best performance observed on each of the indicators across all economies 
in the Doing Business sample since 2005. The country score shows how far, on average, an 
economy is at a point in time from the best performance achieved by any economy on each 
Doing Business indicator since 2005 or the third year in which data for the indicator were 
collected. The measure is normalised to range between 0 and 100, with 100 representing 
the frontier. Thus, higher score implies that a country is ‘closer to the frontier’.






X stands for averages and variances across countries and time for the considered 
variable X.
Because of the involvement of this rescaling method, the estimated coefficients will not 
directly reflect the amplitude of corresponding effects. However, it allows a better judgement 
of the relative explanatory power of each individual variable.
Summary statistics of market capitalisation of listed companies (% of G.D.P.), and the Rule 
of Law index are reported in Table 1. The non-normal values of the distribution parameters 
and the standard deviations suggest important cross-section heterogeneity of data. Hence, 
the estimation methodology should account for such heterogeneity and for the potential 
induced biases.
Figure 1 displays the scatter plot between market capitalisation and the status of the 
legal system. This figure suggests that there might be a direct link between these variables. 
However, a more detailed analysis is required. The next section will consider such analysis.
4. Results and comments
We ran a preliminary analysis in order to highlight the potential impact exercised by rule 
of law on different descriptors of market development. In order to check for potential 
endogeneity, in these estimates we employed an instrumental variables approach, namely 
the (System) Generalised Method of Moments (G.M.M.). The results are reported on Table 
2. These results indicate that Rule of Law index positively and statistically significantly at 
1% (5%) impacts all market development measures. However, the amplitude of associated 







Table 1. summary statistics for market capitalisation and Rule of Law index (rescaled values).
source: authors.
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turnover, followed by market capitalisation, while for number of domestic listed companies 
the amplitude is lower (and less significant). Since we are interested in market growth rather 
than in market performance, we further focused our analysis on market capitalisation.
We considered a multi-level analytical framework with a two-level model and a three-
level one. Multi-level models are particularly appropriate for research designs in which par-
ticipants’ data are organised at more than one level (i.e., nested data) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2012). In the second step, the estimation outcomes from the first step are regressed through 
the group levels (see, for instance, Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2000; 
Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, for more details on such models).
Based on findings from a stream of literature (such as in La Porta et al. (1997), according 
to which civil law countries protect investors the least and common law countries the most), 
the first hierarchical linear model considered the effect of the inclusion of a country in a 
certain legal family on market capitalisation. Using the classification from the University 
of Ottawa (2012), we divided the countries in the sample according to the law system each 
of them uses. A dummy variable ranging the countries from “1” (Sha’ria law-based) to “4” 
(civil law-based) was constructed and the countries nested accordingly. Muslim law systems 
are legal systems based on the Sha’ria and tend to be dominated by laws related to personal 
status. Common law systems are technically based on English Common law concepts and 
legal organisational methods that put first case-law as opposed to legislation. Usually, even 
though the forms of such systems are very different in different countries and they usually 
have an abundance of codes, legislation and non-jurisprudential normative instruments, 
Common law jurisprudence remains the fundamental law. Civil law system countries have 
drawn their rules from Roman law and are characterised by written laws. Such countries 
have opted for a systematic codification of their general law, or if they do not systematically 
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Rule of Law index
Figure 1. market capitalisation and Rule of Law index (rescaled values; 2009–2014 averages). source: 
authors.
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with mixed legal systems (also named ‘composite’ or ‘hybrid’ systems), two or more sys-
tems are applied interactively or cumulatively, or there is a juxtaposition of systems due to 
an unclear definition of the fields of application. The results from applying the model are 
reported in Table 3. The significance of the Rule of Law index decreased from 1% to 5%, 
while the level of the associated effects remains comparable with previous estimates. As 
it concerns the other variables, the most notable change occurs for Strength of legal rights 
index, which is no longer significant within this model. Still, a relative importance similar 
to previous estimates is maintained for all the other variables.
In a second hierarchical linear model, countries were further nested accordingly to 
their overall economic freedom as reflected by the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic 
Freedom.
As Stocker (2005: 583) finds, ‘Results show that the rate of increase in economic freedom 
is directly related to equity returns and that an investment strategy based on economic 
freedom earned attractive investment returns’. Similar results are supported for Middle 
Table 2. Rule of law and financial markets development (system G.m.m.; full sample).
***/**/* -1%, 5%, 10% significance levels.
notes: time dummies for all years are used as instrumental variables in level equation. all instruments are collapsed based 
on Roodman’s (2009) procedure implemented in stata module xtabond2: one instrument for each variable and lag dis-
tance is used, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance. all available lags of the specified variables 
in levels dated t-1 or earlier as instruments for the transformed equation are used as well as the contemporaneous first 
differences as instruments in the levels equation. Forward orthogonal deviations transform are considered instead of 








traded, turnover ratio 
(%)
(1) (2) (3)
Rule of Law index 0.478*** 0.021** 0.664***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.021)
hansen test of over-identified 
restrictions: 
chi2(25) = 5.99 chi2(25) = 4.41 chi2(25) = 5.96 
(Robust, but weakened by many 
instruments.)
(p = 1.000) (p = 1.000) (p = 1.000)
(h0: over-identifying restrictions are 
valid)
number of instruments: 26 26 26
Difference-in-hansen tests of exoge-
neity of instrument subsets:
i.G.m.m. instruments for levels
hansen test excluding group: chi2(21) = 5.94 chi2(21) = 4.92 chi2(21) = 4.57 
(p = 0.999) (p = 1.000) (p = 1.000)
Difference (null h = exogenous): chi2(4) = 0.005 chi2(4) = −0.50 chi2(4) = 1.40
(p = 1.000) (p = 1.000) (p = 0.845)
ii. G.m.m. (L.market capitalisation 
L.Rule of law L.Gni per capita L.Gni 
per capita squared, collapse lag(1 .))
hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 5.76 chi2(5) = 2.42 chi2(5) = 4.62 
(p = 0.330) (p = 0.778) (p = 0.464)
Difference (null h = exogenous): chi2(20) = 0.23 chi2(20) = 1.99 chi2(20) = 1.35 
(p = 1.000) (p = 1.000) (p = 1.000)
iii. iv(yr2009 yr2010 yr2011 yr2012 
yr2013 yr2014)
hansen test excluding group: chi2(19) = 3.75 chi2(19) = 3.55 chi2(19) = 3.95 
(p = 1.000) (p = 1.000) (p = 1.000)
Difference (null h = exogenous): chi2(6) = 2.23 chi2(6) = 0.86 chi2(6) = 2.02 
(p = 0.897) (p = 0.990) (p = 0.918)
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East and North Africa (M.E.N.A.) countries by Smimou and Karabegovic (2010). This 
study highlights that changes in economic freedom have a positive impact on equity market 
returns that cannot be explained by business-cycle control variables related to expected 
returns or by other controls. Hence, we consider a three-level hierarchical linear model 
with two nested levels of countries clustering: level two reflecting the legal family and level 
three describing the degree of economic freedom. Fitting a three-level model requires the 
specification of two random-effects equations: first, one for level three and then one for 
level two. The outcomes are reported in Table 3. In this model, all the main explanatory 
variables appear to be statistically significant at 1%. The relative importance of Rule of Law 
index for market capitalisation is comparable with the ordinary least squares  estimates, 
while the other institutional dimensions reflected by Protecting Minority Investors index, 
Enforcing Contracts index and Strength of legal rights index maintain more or less the same 
levels of associated influences. Finally, for the last model, we noted that several studies 
suggest that growth and institutions (including rule of law) form a coherent nexus mod-
elled by post-materialist values. Thus, we considered a final level for nesting the countries 
accordingly to their post-materialism levels as reflected by the 12-items index proposed by 
Inglehart (1990, 1997); Inglehart and Abramson (1999). In Table 3, the four-level model 
displays a substantial increase in the relative importance of rule of law from previous esti-
mates, but no major changes for the other variables (with the exception of foreign direct 
investments, which are now significant only at 5%).
For all multi-level models the ‘U-shaped’ effect of economic growth on market develop-
ment is clearly evidenced, as well as the corresponding effects induced by banking sector 
contribution to financing the economy. Market liquidity remains a major factor in explaining 
its development, while foreign direct investment appears to inhibit the dynamic of market 
capitalisation.
Up to this point, the findings support a positive impact of overall rule of law on market 
capitalisation. However, the estimates may be biased by reverse causality issues. Indeed, one 
can notice that in our specifications there might be at least two sources of reverse causality: 
the link between the status of the financial sector and the macroeconomic environment, 
and the endogenous impacted institutions.
Hence, an instrumental approach aiming to correct for potential endogeneity should 
be considered.
From various instrumental approaches, we considered the G.M.M. method (Hall, 2005). 
This method involves some moment or orthogonality conditions and allows for heteroske-
dasticity in errors. It provides a rich and flexible framework  to deal with endogeneity and 
is particularly suitable for ‘small T / large N’ (many panels and few periods) cases, as in 
our data set. We used the system estimator version of G.M.M. This uses lagged differences 
as instruments for a level equation in addition to the moment conditions of lagged lev-
els as instruments for a differenced equation (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Blundell, Bond, & 
Windmeijer, 2000).
One critical aspect concerning the implementation of this method is related to the choice 
of the number of instruments: poor performances of estimators of instrumental variables 
may arise due to the fact that their biases increase with the number of moment conditions 
(Newey & Smith, 2004). As Roodman (2009: 128) notes, ‘instrument proliferation can over 
fit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their endogenous components’. Thus, a reduc-
tion of the number of instruments can contribute to an increase in the robustness of the 
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results. With this aim, the instruments are collapsed by applying the procedure described 
by Roodman (2009) and implemented in the STATA xtabond2 module. This procedure 
leads to a reduction in the number of instrument used from 154 possible instruments to 
only 64 effectively considered.
The results from Table 3 show that the involvements of System G.M.M. leads to a sub-
stantial increase (almost three times) in the effects induced by Rule of Law index on market 
capitalisation, while these effects remain positive and significant at 1%. Since the values of 
the Difference-in-Hansen tests for exogeneity of instrument subsets support the choice of 
instruments, this outcome can be viewed as reflecting the existence of reverse causality: the 
causality might flow not only from the architecture and de facto status of legal systems to the 
market capitalisation, but also from this descriptor of financial market development to the 
features of the institutional framework. Interestingly, in System G.M.M., Enforcing Contracts 
index completely lost its significance and the corresponding coefficient displayed a ‘wrong’ 
sign: the efficiency of the judicial system to solve commercial disputes is overwritten by the 
broader descriptor of social agents abiding by societal norms and rules. Meanwhile, the 
Protecting Minority Investors index becomes significant at 1% and the coefficient increases 
more than four times. Also, the market liquidity is no longer significant. Nevertheless, other 
previous findings are preserved by this instrumental variables method. In particular, there 
are no major changes compared with previous estimates for the ‘U-shaped’ impact of growth 
on market capitalisation as well as for the importance of banking sector.
We further note that our data set includes countries with heterogeneous levels of overall 
economic development. Such heterogeneity is potentially able to shape the transmission 
channels for the impact of rule of law on markets in specific ways. In order to illustrate 
this idea, we add as an explanatory variable the interactions between market capitalisation 
and a dummy for high-income countries classified based on their income per capita. The 
most striking result is that the significance of Rule of Law index declines to 10% while the 
amplitude of impact is almost two times lower compared with the previous System G.M.M. 
estimation. Since high-income countries are usually characterised by strong and effective 
legal systems, this variable is less able to discriminate in terms of market development. 
However, the enforcement of contracts now counts, with a positive and significant at 1% 
impact. From other variables, market liquidity appears as in other estimation methods to 
exercise a positive and significant impact on market capitalisation, while foreign direct 
investment no longer seems to influence this. Also, the time dummies for 2009 and 2010 
now exhibit a negative and significant impact on markets: when the model accounts for 
the high-income countries group, the recent period of financial and real turmoil shown to 
inhibit market development.
When the same exercise is repeated by adding the interactions between market cap-
italisation and a dummy for low to middle-income countries, rule of law does not gain 
significance: at the opposite sides of the development spectrum (and for different reasons), 
rule of law appears to be less able to explain the status of financial markets.
From the controls, economic growth preserves its non-linear impact while the ‘net’ 
amplitude of this is somewhat smaller compared with other estimations. Meanwhile, market 
liquidity fully loses its significance, while the relative importance of the banking sector as 
explanatory slightly decreases.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA  475
5. Conclusions
This paper aims to find conceptual support and some empirical findings for the link between 
the quality and effectiveness of institutions and financial market development. We advance 
a threefold contribution to this topic. First, we develop a model in which markets are 
driven in a non-linear way by economic growth as well as by various components of the 
legal framework. More exactly, such a model is designed to reflect the non-linear linkages 
between the evolutionary paths of financial markets and various determinants to its complex 
dynamics: (1) the overall economic growth; (2) the market efficiency (as this is expressed in 
terms of market returns), and (3) the specific endogenous and exogenous risks. In this set 
of determinants investors’ risk profiles play a critical role. Hence, risk reduction is viewed 
as an important channel through which strong, accountable, transparent and efficient insti-
tutions support financial markets. Although each of these determinants is addressed in the 
framework of different approaches by the current literature, to our best knowledge, there is 
no model designed to advance a unified approach to include all the determinants together.
Second, we provide some empirical evidence for a data set of 45 countries and for a time 
span between 2009 and 2014. A relatively coherent picture emerges from these findings. 
First, it appears that the rule of law exercises a positive and significant impact on mar-
ket capitalisation which is robust across various estimation methods and across different 
model specifications. But the relationship between the status of the legal system and market 
capitalisation is influenced by various factors, such as the type of legal family, economic 
freedom, cultural and behavioural variables (such as the spread of post-materialistic views) 
or overall economic development, and is weaker for countries placed at the extremes of 
the development spectrum. Also, the causality runs in both directions: from institutions 
to financial markets as well as from markets to the endogenous component of the legal 
framework. One can note that only limited attention is paid by current literature to the 
potential endogeneity of the institutional framework in respect to capital market develop-
ment. Hence, if the analysis of the causality running from institutions to the markets can 
be placed in the broad framework of neo-institutionalism approaches, the reverse causality 
running from capital markets toward institutional development can be seen as a relatively 
new topic. From the descriptors of particular features of the legal system, enforcing contracts 
and the protection of borrowers’ and lenders’ rights are fairly robust, while effects induced 
by the protection of minority investors appears to be less clear. Second, growth impacts the 
evolution of financial markets in a non-linear fashion. Once again, such impact is robust 
across estimation methods and specifications. Third, the development of banking sector 
unambiguously supports market capitalisation. Meanwhile, the ease and safety of access to 
loans provided by banks inhibits market growth. There seems to be a rather bivalent rela-
tion of support and competition between the segments of financial sector. Even though the 
issues related to the choice between various types of financing resources is a long-standing 
point debated in the literature, such a bivalent link between capital markets and the capital 
system is less highlighted, since usually the research is mainly focused on the individual 
impact exercised by bank operations on capital markets. Fourth, in all estimates foreign 
direct investment appears to inhibit local financial markets. Since we did not explicitly 
control for the geographical orientation of these investments, we only can presume that 
for countries with weaker financial systems a substantial capital inflow related to these 
cannot be fully ‘sterilised’, and hence can contribute to an increase in internal financial 
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instability (along with the effects of various exogenous shocks from international markets 
that translate various types of risk to local ones).Third, we derive several policy implications 
from our findings. First, sound institutions and an adequate design of the legal framework 
(particularly, the protection of property rights and of minority investors, enforcement of 
contracts, and proper financial regulations) can boost the development of financial markets. 
But, especially in earlier stages of market evolution, the effectiveness of rule of law cannot 
substitute good public growth-oriented policies to support the business environment and 
a sustainable path of economic growth. This result sounds a cautionary note for the policy 
makers, namely that the adoption of a sound regulatory framework might not be enough 
to support the early stages of capital market development. Second, the micro-structures of 
the markets appear to be equally important as their macro legal, institutional and functional 
framework. Hence, efficient instruments are required to improve the efficiency of allocation 
mechanisms and to increase liquidity. This outcome points toward some intrinsic limitations 
of any approach that deals exclusively with either instruments and neglects their necessary 
interactions. Third, the protection of minority investors may not be enough to support 
development of markets, and a broader improvement in the quality of governance at the 
level of financial instruments issuers may be mandatory to support the evolution of financial 
markets. Fourth, countries should be able not only to take advantages from globalisation 
processes but should also alleviate the exogenous risks associated with such processes.
Of course, our proposed analysis is a limited one. More research should be done both at 
conceptual level (to better highlight the various involved linkages between institutions and 
market development) as well as at an empirical level (by extending the data set and con-
sidering more potential explanatory variables). But we consider that this analysis provides 
some support for the thesis that institutions matter for the sound dynamics of financial 
markets. However, one of the most interesting contributions of the proposed research is 
the idea that the opposite also holds true: exogenous development of capital markets might 
lead to an improvement of the regulatory framework and, broadly speaking, to a better 
institutional quality.
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